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Abstract
The state attorneys general (AGs) play a crucial role in government, on both a state and national level.
They provide the legal voice of the state in matters ranging from the defense of state laws to consumer
protection and, for some, criminal prosecution. The increase in the amount of multistate litigation
undertaken by the attorneys general and their growing influence over policy reflect an expansion in the
scope of this office. Furthermore, the AG’s office provides an effective record-building platform from
which candidates can, and often do, establish campaigns for higher office. The 1998 Tobacco Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA), a massive settlement with 46 state AGs costing the tobacco industry nearly
$250 billion over 25 years, may be a landmark case signaling expansion in both the scope of the office and
the tendency of officeholders to run for a higher office. Using an analysis of the number of multistate cases
settled during an individual AG’s tenure and their subsequent decision to seek election to a higher office,
this research seeks to identify trends and relationships in the office of the state AGs.
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Introduction

The attorneys general (AGs) are without question an important official in state
governments across the country. This office, which is traced back to the English
government, has been active in American governance since the colonial period. With a
statewide constituency and potential for statewide name recognition, the AGs have the
capacity to make strong impacts, which can be translated into runs for higher office. As
Provost (2003) claims that “because attorneys general have so many duties that involve
so many substantive issues, their ability to influence state politics is tremendous (39).”
The office is found in every state, but there are a number of notable differences
existing between the individual offices. The offices are established in law in each state,
although the sources of their authority are derived from differing combinations of
constitutional provisions, statutes, and common law. Not all AGs have the same areas of
jurisdiction. For example, some AGs have jurisdiction over criminal prosecution, but
other states house this jurisdiction elsewhere. In 43 states, the AG is popularly elected to
four year terms (with the exception of Vermont, where the AG serves two year terms).
Seventeen of these states impose term limits on their AG. Additionally, the AG election
does not fall in the same year as gubernatorial elections in a small number of states,
meaning the already down-ballot race is often subject to low-voter turnout. For many
years, it was considered an office in which the AG candidate simply rode the coattails of
the governor into office through a “majority-party-takes-all dynamic (Smith et al. 2005:
118).” Every calendar year there is at least one state electing a new AG, with the vast
majority (over 30) being elected in midterm election cycles. The AG is appointed by the
governor in Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming, by secret
ballot of the state legislature in Maine, and by the state Supreme Court for an eight year
term in Tennessee.
Despite differences, AGs across the nation maintain the ability to represent their
states in legal matters. Common law holds that AGs are “the proper representative of the
people of the state in all courts of justice (COAG 1977: 194).” They do not require the
approval of the governor or the legislature in order to act (Provost 2009). AGs are
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members of the executive branch, and while most interact voluntarily or informally, some
attorneys general have either the ability or requirement to work closely with the state
legislature in shaping policy that will eventually become the laws AGs are charged with
defending. In fact, they often take on roles crossing branches of government through
responsibilities that can be viewed as “quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial (“Appointing
State Attorneys General: Evaluating the Unbundled State Executive: 980).” One area of
AG authority that eventually spread to become a national standard among offices was
work specifically geared toward consumer education and protection. Finally, all attorneys
general have the ability, if not responsibility, to issue advisory opinions on the state
constitution and law.
An understanding of the abilities and characteristics of the individual offices is
important, but attorneys general have, over time, exercised their ability to work
collaboratively. Attorneys general can work alone, but have found more success in
investigating, suing, and/or settling when they join forces. An early example of this
success is the multistate antitrust action states took against the Standard Oil Company in
1907, leading to the establishment of the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG). This bipartisan organization continues to facilitate the sharing of ideas,
policies, and best practices and creates a forum from which many multistate legal actions
can arise.
Multistate legal challenges by the attorneys general allow these state officials to
have a prominent role on the federal lawmaking stage (Provost 2006). However, they also
have the capability to be influential outside of these cases. AGs can (and often do) submit
amicus curiae briefs in the cases of other states to demonstrate the importance of the
matter to the court (Provost 2003). They are able to testify not only at legislative hearings
in their respective statehouses, but can give testimony in US Congressional hearing as
federal policies are being debated and created. Finally, AGs often exercise the ability to
send official letters to Congressional leaders on Capitol Hill to publicly voice an opinion
on a matter before the legislature or a federal issue impacting the states.
While the structural foundations of the attorneys general’s power are important to
understand, the support AGs receive from outside policy and political groups has been
crucial. NAAG, which was founded in the wake of an important multistate settlement
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over 100 years ago, continues to be a resource for the AGs in collaboration and
coordination in state level work with a national impact. Similar in intention to NAAG
bringing attorneys general together for a common purpose, both major political parties
formed their own super PACs to facilitate collective partisan action. In 1999, under the
auspices of fighting back against regulatory lawsuit abuse, a group of Republican AGs
formed the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA) (Smith et al. 2005). The
formation of RAGA was followed closely by its Democratic counterpart, the Democratic
Attorneys General Association (DAGA). The two super PACs continue to grow in size
and influence. All three organizations regularly host meetings that allow attorneys
general and their staff to interact with one another and corporate and industry leaders.
However, a primary function of RAGA and DAGA is to recruit candidates, fundraise,
and campaign in support of their party.
As evidenced by the argument that AGs have become more powerful, the ability
to join forces across states and party lines, and the increasing frequency of the practice,
clearly denotes the necessity of attorneys general maintaining close professional
relationships with one another. Thus, the clear partisan separation existing between
RAGA and DAGA makes the formal non-aggression agreement between the two both
interesting and imperative. The non-aggression pact simply holds both organizations to a
promise to not actively campaign in opposition to any currently sitting AG of the
opposite party. This practice, although certainly surprising and potentially inconvenient
in the modern world of partisan politics and super PACs, has benefitted attorneys general
by maintaining a level of civility and comradery among serving AGs that allows them
work together in the face of partisan differences that may characteristically separate other
politicians from such productivity.
A notable instance of multistate litigation that thrust the attorneys general into the
national spotlight was a 1998 settlement with the nation’s top four tobacco manufacturers
to settle a number of state lawsuits related to medical costs of smoking-related diseases.
Forty-six states were party to the MSA (“NAAG Center for Tobacco and Public Health”),
which requires annual multi-billion dollar payments to the states and US territories. The
MSA tightened restrictions on tobacco manufacturing and marketing, and it continues to
provide for smoking cessation initiatives, especially geared toward American youth.
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According to NAAG, smoking in the US has decreased by more than 48% since the
settlement (“NAAG Center for Tobacco and Public Health”). Although this is not the first
or only example of successful, large-scale multistate litigation, the attorneys general
received widespread attention as a result.
Because the attorneys general have a statewide constituency and many have the
experience of campaigning to enter the office, it is not shocking that AGs often choose to
seek a higher office. In fact, a common joke in the realm of attorneys general is that AG
stands for “aspiring governor” or “almost governor” instead of “attorney general.” Due to
their exposure and ability to campaign on the record of achievements from tenure as an
AG, these officials are in a very effective position to express political ambition by using
the office of AG as a stepping stone to higher office. In fact, both RAGA and DAGA
promote the role they play in selecting AGs who later become potential candidates for
higher offices.
From the variety of factors that influence attorneys general and the sparse
research readily available on the office, relatively little is definitively known about this
important office. Has the scope of the office expanded over time through increased
litigation, authority, and public perception? Are attorneys general typically politically
ambitious? Did the Tobacco MSA have an impact on increases in litigation and/or
ambition? This research seeks to answer these questions through an analysis of literature,
case data, decisions of AGs to seek higher office, statistical relationships, and interviews
with several current and former attorneys general.
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Literature Review

The office of the state AG is one that possesses a long history of public service
and influence. A commission created by the National Association of Attorneys General,
the Committee on the Office of the Attorney General (COAG), published the
comprehensive report Powers, Duties and Operations of State Attorneys General
detailing the origins of the office and its evolution over time. The roots of the office can
be traced back to a similar role of the sovereign’s legal representation in 13th and 14th
century England. The office was later established in a modified capacity in the American
colonies and was ultimately carried into state governments. Initially, not every state
always had an AG, and it was not always a permanent office in the states that did have
one. Eventually the AG’s office became a staple of state government across the country,
and it was included in the first draft of 34 of the 50 states’ constitutions (COAG 1977).
States now establish the office either through state constitutional provisions or statutes,
and it gains further authority through a “long line of case law” dating back to 1850
(COAG 1977).
The basic responsibilities of the attorneys general are similar across the country,
although the “office of Attorney General must be viewed in the context of the
government of which it is a part (COAG 1977: 29).” They are responsible for defending
the state constitution and its laws and they have the power to initiate legal action on
behalf of a state and its citizens. As a number of state governments went through a period
of restructuring in the 1960s, the NAAG commission reported that AG offices saw few
changes- possibly because there was a reluctance to increase the authority of the office,
or, conversely, because of a reluctance to diminish their power by transferring
responsibilities elsewhere (COAG 1977).
AGs have consistently exercised their power over time, and historical reviews of
the office prove that AG independence has been longstanding (Tetrault 2010). Tetrault
(2010) researches the existing tensions between AGs and state insurance commissioners
to demonstrate the independence the AGs possess by becoming “involved in the
oversight of the insurance matters, thereby encroaching upon the jurisdiction of or
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clashing directly or indirectly with the authority to state insurance commissioners
(Tetrault 2010: 1).” The example of this intergovernmental relationship makes the claim
that the structure of the executive branches of state governments gives AGs the ability to
“establish himself as a populist foil to…the governor” and can “make accusations and
charges with almost no accountability (Tetrault 2010: 4).” Although claiming these
officials operate under no accountability may be somewhat drastic, Provost (2006)
reaffirms that the authority of the AG is determined, at least in common law, to be the
representation of the public interest and characterizes it as a “vastly powerful office” with
the “power to influence the state policy agenda in a multitude of ways (611).” The work
of AGs does not require any sort of approval or support in pursuing cases, while even
governors require coalition building and/or legislative support to carry out their agendas
(Provost, 2009). This authority, he says, “has provided us with very few examples of
governors actually trying to limit SAG authority and this is perhaps the best evidence of a
lack of control (613).” This lack of gubernatorial control, indicative of AG independence,
is further perpetuated by the AGs’ broad authority and “virtually total autonomy over
consumer-protection issues (Provost 2003: 43).” Sometimes attorneys general have gone
so far as to claim that the role of their office is to serve as a check on and balance to the
power of the executive office of the state. Although this relationship may seem debatable,
it raises a number of questions regarding just how much power and/or accountability the
AG does or should have. Most significantly, it begs Matheson’s question: “who guards
the guardians? (Tetrault 2010: 3)”
This independence is tangibly reflected in two prominent examples. In the 1990s,
Mississippi’s then-Governor Kirk Fordice sued then-AG Mike Moore in an attempt to
prevent Attorney General Moore from initiating a state lawsuit against tobacco
manufacturers (Provost 2003). Attorney General Moore not only demonstrated his
authority to pursue the suit, but began a successful multi-billion dollar campaign that
eventually led to the significant downturn in smoking across the nation. A more
contemporary example is the legal battle that recently ensued between Colorado
Governor John Hickenlooper and Attorney General Cynthia Coffman. Gov. Hickenlooper
opposed AG Coffman’s decision to include Colorado on a multistate lawsuit being
pursued against the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (Paul 2006). The
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governor sought the state Supreme Court’s opinion on the AG’s authority to join the suit
without his prior approval. The constant power struggle between governors and attorneys
general over time in high-profile cases demonstrates just how powerful each office has
the potential to be.
While some literature can create an image of an all-powerful AG, research still
maintains the office of governor to be the most powerful and prestigious in each state,
which is logical given its level of public recognition. The notion of AG being a
“springboard” or “stepping stone” alone reflects that the office is not the highest
available. Although Provost (2009) states that “some observers have suggested that the
position nearly rivals the governor’s office in terms of power and prestige (4),” he
characterizes the office as being “increasingly recognized as a prominent springboard
into various higher offices (1).” This reveals that many officeholders do not see AG as
their ultimate career goal, but rather as a place along their path to higher office. While
research into AG authority and policy roles does reveal the power of the attorneys
general, this notion is tempered by the reminder that “Governors, in short, are the top
dogs in the states (Smith et al. 2005: 253).” Some may still debate the merits of the
perceived or actual powers of one office versus another, but the struggle ultimately
reflects the importance of the AG’s office while still reinforcing the perception of the
governor as the highest political figure within a state.
Multistate litigation has long been a practice in the AG offices. While this
research makes the claim that the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement was a turning
point for AG power and ambition, it was not the first instance of important multistate
litigation. In 1907, attorneys general formed NAAG as a means of discussing “a common
approach to antitrust issues related to the Standard Oil Company (National Association of
Attorneys General).” Clearly, this collaboration was imperative as it led to an
organization that has been at the forefront of AG interaction for over 100 years. Iowa
Attorney General Tom Miller points out the importance of multistate litigation beginning
in the 1970s when a number of individual states wanted to pursue legal action against
General Motors, but decided to work together when they became worried that GM would
“out-resource” them (Greenblatt 2003). Provost (2006) argues that multistate litigation
was “probably inevitable” because single office resources are not sufficient for pursuing
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such large cases. The settlements with big tobacco, which were initiated by Mississippi
Attorney General Mike Moore and eventually settled by every state after an unsuccessful
proposed act of the US Congress, is undoubtedly an important case. Regardless of its
influence on the office, the case set new industry standards and served as an additional
reminder to corporations about the ramifications associated with poor and/or deceptive
practices. The success of these suits is reflective of the strong work of attorneys general
over time and has led to a growing desire among companies and the US Chamber of
Commerce to be involved in AG races as litigation by the AGs against businesses grows
(Smith et al. 2005; Provost 2006). Corporations being sued by the AGs have started
requesting more states join onto lawsuits before settling as a means of preventing
litigation later in the future by additional states, especially larger states such as California
and New York (Provost 2006). In fact, RAGA initially grew out of a perceived abuse in
the frequency of these lawsuits, although they have arguably not become any less
prevalent since the organization’s foundation. Provost (2003) describes AGs that
frequently participate in these suits as “entrepreneurial,” explaining that their actions
have an impact on a national scale. He describes the multistate litigation-joining
motivations of the attorneys general as being both for political profit and for agenda
setting in what laws or violations matter most (Provost 2003). This same research finds
the AG’s office to be an “excellent laboratory for studying entrepreneurs” as the officials
use their resources and powers of litigation differently, but often collaboratively, across
the country (Provost 2003). Overall, state AGs realized that multistate lawsuits allowed
them to “outgun wealthy business interests,” and these suits became increasingly logical
as businesses expanded into national chains across state lines (Provost 2009).
Such expansive legal work has been crucial in determining the relationship
between the AGs and the federal government. Kincaid (1990) quotes President Woodrow
Wilson in saying that the “cardinal question of our constitutional system” is the
relationship that should exist between the federal government and the states. Kincaid
goes on to describe the shift in the 1970s and 1980s from a cooperative style of
federalism to a coercive style of federalism. Because of this changing dynamic between
the federal and state governments, states began a sort of “resurgence” in response to
federal (usually unfunded or seemingly burdensome) mandates imposed on states and
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federal preemption of state and local authority (Kincaid). It is thus plausible to expect
during this time for the role of AGs, especially in suits involving responses to the federal
government’s mandates and preemptions, to increase. Although Kincaid’s research places
a greater emphasis on the role of the governors in responding to expanding regulation
during the shift into cooperative federalism, attorneys general led the legal pushback of
this era (COAG 1977). Furthermore, the trend of attorneys general fighting the federal
government has only continued. An AG participating in an interview detailed later in this
research explained that multistate lawsuits against the White House or federal
government can frequently be seen as a reflection of the relationship between the party of
the AGs involved in the suit and the party in control of the White House. However, both
partisan and bipartisan suits can reflect the role the White House and federal government
commonly plays as a common and convenient enemy (Conlan 1991).
One of the areas that has seen some of the most influential evolution for the office
is that of consumer protection. This area began as a small number of attorneys general
filing lawsuits against corporations in the name of enforcing laws that would benefit
consumers. Eventually, NAAG created a commission dedicated entirely to this area of
law which the AGs agreed was so important. The Committee for Consumer Protection
began a cooperative interstate information exchange in 1969, and in 1971, it formally
endorsed holding bi-annual meetings for AGs’ consumer protection staff. NAAG
publicly recommended that states locate their consumer protection agencies within the
AGs’ offices (COAG 1977). COAG (1977) reported that “The fact that most consumer
protection programs evolved as part of Attorneys General’s offices would seem to
indicate that this is a logical out-growth of the office’s traditional functions (320).”
Provost explains that participation in these lawsuits is largely determined by the interests
or needs that will resonate most with voters and within the business communities in the
AG’s state. Consumer protection settlements result in constituents benefitting directly,
states receiving a significant sum of money to increase government funding, and ending
business practices that deceive and harm consumers. These specific types of cases are
important because they reflect not only the power of attorneys general to act as corporate
law enforcement officials, but how their work brings tangible results to their states and
their constituents as individuals.
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While NAAG has been a nonpartisan vehicle of cooperation for the attorneys
general over time, the establishment of two partisan super PACs has created additional
influence of outside groups in the work of attorneys general. Both of these groups
influence the campaigning, policymaking, and litigation of attorneys general of their
respective parties. RAGA, founded in 1999, and DAGA, founded in 2000, give AGs and
their staffs chances to interact with their own partisan delegation through regular
meetings, which also serve as opportunities to meet with lobbyists and government
affairs industry representatives. Potentially more importantly, both organizations are
involved in the recruitment and election of candidates from their parties. RAGA founder
and former Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor defended the necessity of recruiting
quality candidates to the office since so aspire to run for governor and US Senate
(Greenblatt 2002). In fact, both RAGA and DAGA point to the frequency of this trend on
their websites. In reference to recruiting and supporting candidates, RAGA’s website
states, “RAGA is improving the talent base from which many future Governors and U.S.
Senators will be drawn. (www.republicanags.com)” In the Mission portion of DAGA’s
website, the following statement is included: “Increasingly the office of the attorney
general has served as a stepping stone to higher state and federal office.
(www.democraticags.org)” Thus, RAGA and DAGA can contribute to the substantive
work of the AGs, but they also attempt to expand upon the potential of attorneys general
to later win an office higher than what they currently hold.
Finally, political ambition is a concept that has long been a part of holding public
office. Schlesinger (1966) analyzed ambition, saying it “lies at the heart of politics (1).”
Swinerton (1968) researched different types of ambition among appointed state
executives— “progressive1,” “discrete2,” and “static3.” Provost (2003) cites research that
finds increased policy activity among legislators with progressive ambition. These related
findings can be applied to the office of the state AG and its officeholders. Simply seeking
the office of AG at all reflects a degree of political ambition, and election independent of
the governor allows the AG to develop a power base of their own (Smith et al. 2005).
1

Officeholders who plan to use one office as a stepping stone to another higher office
Officeholders who are interested only in serving the term to which they are elected and then
withdrawing from holding elected office
3
Officeholders who are interested in maintaining lengthy service in one office
2
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Assuming that these officeholders possess more progressive ambition would not be an
outrageous notion. Provost (2009) suggests that this “assumption of universal progressive
ambition is more plausible in the case of state AGs (4).” Attorneys general can exercise
their ambition by running for a host of other offices, both at higher and lower levels than
AG. Many joke that AG is often short for “aspiring governor,” and Provost (2009)
concludes that the office of AG is ”increasingly recognized as a prominent springboard
into various higher offices (1).” In light of the many evolving and understudied aspects of
the AG’s office, the evolution of political ambition may be one of the most interesting
underlying motivators for many AGs by having a significant impact on the ways in which
they choose to exercise the power of their offices.
The office of the state AGs is relatively understudied in political science
literature. This office provides an interesting perspective on the power and influence of
state officials on policies both within and stretching far outside of their state lines. The
political ambition that many identify in this office reflects a trend that may be common
among elected politicians. This ambition may not necessarily be negative as the office
provides a relatively effective platform for introduction to state and national
policymaking for candidates aspiring to higher positions of greater visibility and
influence. Only so much can be gained from researching data related to individuals and
making assumptions about their characteristics, thus necessitating input from AGs
themselves.
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Attorney General Interviews

In order to better understand how political ambition shapes the activities of AGs, I
conducted interviews with a number of AGs. This research greatly benefitted from the
opportunity to conduct these interviews with sitting and former attorneys general to gain
their insights on the office and the claims of the research. The AGs consulted in the
research represented current and former attorneys general, Republican and Democrats,
males and females, and all methods of selection. Interviews were conducted with the
promise of total confidentiality in order to have the most candid and insightful
conversations, thus any identifying characteristics and direct quotes are not included.
These interviews give both institutional information as well as an understanding of the
human, emotional reasoning that plays an active role in the decision making and careers
of the state attorneys general. The goal of the interviews was to get an initial assessment
of how AGs view their offices as well as their post-AG career ambitions and trajectories.
The interviewees began by describing their career paths and motivations to
become an AG. They shared stories of career paths almost always driven by a desire of a
career in public service. Many explained that AG seemed to be a natural expansion of the
work they had already begun. Several noted a deep respect for the office, and they were
encouraged by the potential to work in an influential office where their legal expertise
could be used to bring about positive change in each of their states.
Because the topic of political ambition has led to the joke of AG standing for
aspiring governor or almost governor, the interviewees shared their thoughts on whether
or not they are currently or did at one point plan to seek higher office, if they personally
viewed the office as a stepping stone, and if they believe there are any positive or
negative impacts as a result of the “almost governor” joke. A number of AGs viewed
holding a higher office, specifically governor, as a natural progression or sort of
promotion. As it is normal for the average person to want to climb the corporate ladder
when working in the private sector, so too they often saw it as normal for AGs wish to
rise to higher levels of government office. While AG may be a person’s highest political
ambition, it is also almost expected that many would desire election or appointment to a
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higher office. Although aware of the office’s tendency to be used for campaigning for
another office, none of the interviewees said that the potential political springboard was
an influential factor in their decision to become AG.
Personal factors matter in an AG’s decision to seek office. Many AGs explained
the importance of timing in their decisions to run (when a seat was open or they did not
expect a primary challenge) and the consideration of another campaign’s effects on their
family. The appointed attorneys general interviewed disagreed with the characterization
of the office as a stepping stone in appointing states. Although the research does not
analyze this claim, it seems reasonable that appointed attorneys general begin with a
lesser degree of political ambition (if any at all) in comparison to attorneys general who
choose to go through the process of campaigning for the office.
When discussing the implications of using the almost/aspiring governor joke, the
attorneys general expressed a range of sentiments. Overall, many agreed that it simply
reflects a reality in which they exist—many AGs do run for governor, so it is an accurate
statement. One explained that tensions and/or disapproval of administration among the
different branches of government is a significant factor in attorneys general seeking a
governorship, more so than political ambition. Another AG explained that this term is
more common within the AG world and few members of the general public know or care.
Many believe that it does not always have negative connotations, but reflects the
importance of the office and the officeholder in state government. It has the potential to
give the AG a higher profile in state matters, drawing constituent attention to work they
are doing on the state’s behalf. Those that believe it may be a negative term explained
that it draws attention away from the work the AG is doing by shifting focus to potential
runs for office or by making claims about the political motivations of the AGs. It can also
create the impression that the officeholder is just passing through or using the office
simply for its political potential. In contrast, several AGs shared that they do not always
believe it is accurate. While many do run for higher office, governor is not always the
chosen office. It is not an equally effective stepping stone in each state, especially in
states that appoint their AGs. Finally, it was made clear that, while this joke may be used
in realm of the AGs, it is not the AGs themselves that typically (if ever) perpetuate its
usage. This could possibly indicate the importance of the office to the officeholders
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themselves—while they may wish to run for a higher office, they avoid downplaying the
importance of the office of AG.
Questions then shifted to perceptions of multistate litigation and settlements.
Interviewees were asked if they personally perceived an increase in these cases, how
important they found it to work across state lines, and if they had any thoughts on the
impacts of the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement. All of the AGs were quick to
voice support for the beneficial nature of multistate legal action. They explained that this
is a clear way to share advice and best practices on issues facing the states. These cases
allow collaboration on complex legal matters, and this collaboration allows AGs to save
taxpayer money by pooling the resources of multiple offices. Interviewees described
multistate work as evidence that attorneys general exercise great strength in numbers.
This strength is often most prized among smaller states that may not possess as much
political and/or corporate clout or have access to as many resources (from both a financial
and staffing perspective) as larger and/or wealthier states. Additionally, these suits and
settlements are often the source of significant funding for many states, adding to the
appeal of being a party to the case. The MSA, for example, requires tobacco companies
to pay billions of dollars annually to the states. All of the AGs were quick to specify that
joining forces is not a novel concept, as clearly evidenced by the myriad multistate
lawsuits and settlements throughout history.
However, a number of interviewees did agree that they perceived an increase in
the frequency of these cases during their tenure as AG. One specifically explained that a
change created by the increase was the institutionalization of multistate collaboration—
some states began dedicating staff to work specifically on these cases. Furthermore, a few
attorneys general explained that personal relationships influence states joining forces on
legal issues, most specifically through amicus curiae briefs. These documents of support
from their colleagues aided in the perception of their issue as important before the court.
There were several instances mentioned in which attorneys general joined a case or
submitted a brief on an issue they were not heavily invested in at the request of another
AG they were friends with. Ultimately, the attorneys general seemed to be of the opinion
that multistate litigation is both increasing and very effective, and the MSA’s greatest
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impact was on the public perception of the role and abilities of the attorneys general to
significantly impact public policy and corporate responsibility.
The attorneys general proceeded to discuss the influence of other states’ AGs on
their own work. They agreed that they do develop close friendships with their
counterparts in other states and these relationships are critical in their ability to reach
across partisan lines in working on national issues. They are able to develop trusted
relationships to provide them with sources of best practices and sounding boards for
issues they are working to resolve in their home states. One interviewee raised the
interesting point that, while the typically good working relationships among all of the
AGs can be beneficial, it has the potential to lead AGs to be less thoughtful in where they
should draw a line in using their resources to help a friend on an issue that may be
irrelevant to them or their state.
In direct relation to the discussion of friendships and working relationships across
state and party lines, multiple AGs specifically mentioned the non-aggression pact
between RAGA and DAGA as the most critical factor in preserving these relationships
between the AGs. They explained that, because so many issues do cross state lines or
have certain regional impacts that may not reflect regional party affiliation, they often
need to reach out to colleagues on the other side of the aisle. Because of the agreement to
not campaign against their fellow attorneys general, the AGs are able to maintain a
professional relationship with one another that more readily transcends partisanship than
most other political offices can experience.
The interviewees moved on to a discussion on the purpose and substantive value
of RAGA and/or DAGA, and then compared these organizations to their experience at
NAAG. All did agree that, from the knowledge they had of RAGA and DAGA, the
largest purpose was to fundraise and campaign for the affiliated attorneys general and
candidates. A few believe the organizations serve no other purpose. However, the rest did
agree that substantive work related to the office was accomplished through RAGA and
DAGA. Many mentioned the benefits of being able to check with or coordinate with
members of their own party delegation on how to handle certain issues. Some
interviewees expressed that RAGA and DAGA helped them to realize when it was
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appropriate or necessary to either reach across the aisle or work closely along party lines
on certain matters.
Comparatively, they all agreed that NAAG meetings allowed for more balanced
substance than what was typically found at their partisan meetings, and it allowed for the
development of bipartisan relationships that clearly cannot be facilitated through super
PACs. NAAG proved beneficial to many of them in learning not only when but how to
work across ideological divides. Finally, a few AGs again mentioned the importance of
NAAG in facilitating the formalization of the nonaggression pact between RAGA and
DAGA that allows the attorneys general to continue bipartisan collaboration.
Outside of relationships with other AGs, the ability to work with other state
officials is also important. Given the joke about AGs as almost or aspiring governor, the
AGs’ relationships with the governors they serve alongside could potentially be strained
or jeopardized. All of the AGs expressed the importance of a professional, working
relationship with the governor to be most effective, although this collegial relationship is
not always a reality. Many also noted an inherent, underlying power struggle of sorts
between the two offices. While it may at first seem logical that attorneys general would
prefer to serve with governors of the same political persuasion as themselves, several
explained that serving with a governor of the opposite party creates a healthy tension and
balance of ideologies, and allows both officials to feel more confident in challenging the
other over important issues. One AG said that this potential for challenges (regardless of
party differences) is also helpful because it brings attention and exposure to the office
when they publically challenge, and at times even defy, the governor.
One of the most interesting topics addressed by many of the AGs in regards to
their relationships with governors was the differing responsibilities of the AG’s office
and the governor’s office. They maintained the importance of being independent from the
governor and reiterated that the AG, not the governor, is the expected to be the voice of
the people. This leads to clashes between the AG and the governor over the appropriate
role of the AG in determining when a state will be involved in any sort of legal action.
AGs across the nation have come to the defense of their colleagues, defending their roles
as the people’s lawyers. Interviewees mentioned several court cases that have upheld this
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relationship, deciding that only the AG of a state can claim to make an argument on
behalf of the people.
Due to the differing methods of selection across the country and represented by
the interviewees, they shared their perspectives on the most appropriate way of choosing
an AG at the state level. Interestingly, most of them said they could see the merits of both
election and appointment, although all defended the process used in their home state.
Those favoring election expressed the necessity of being accountable to the people of the
state, while AGs favoring appointment said that they were able to focus more on
substantive work because they were not required to campaign during their tenure in
office. The most interesting argument provided in favor of appointment was the
importance of selecting a qualified attorney to serve in the office. Although there are not
necessarily specific requirements set forth about what qualifies an attorney to be AG, it is
logical to assume that state officials and voters alike would desire the most qualified
attorney to hold the office. In fact, prior research holds that appointed AGs typically
appear to be better credentialed than elected AGs. This is reflected by the tendency of
appointed AGs to go on to become judges, while elected AGs are more likely to run for
political offices (“Appointing State Attorneys General: Evaluating the Unbundled State
Executive” 986). By removing the campaigning aspect of selecting an AG, it creates the
potential for at least a slightly greater degree of importance to be placed on legal skill
over campaigning prowess. Surprisingly, the reasoning behind each AG’s defense of
selection methods was based on the importance of the office being independent of the
governor and/or being accountable to the people of the state.
An important relationship for the attorneys general within their states is that with
their respective legislatures. There are different opportunities, based both on state laws
and customs as well as the personal attributes of the officeholders, for AGs to work or
coordinate with lawmakers in their respective statehouses. The most common themes in
this answer involved the myriad ways that AGs can formally and informally shape or
influence the policy that ultimately becomes state law. Many brought up the point that,
not only do they want to accomplish positive changes that are important to them, but they
also see the practicality of being involved to some degree in laws that they may one day
be expected to defend.
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Finally, interviewees discussed their perception of the duty to defend their states’
constitutions and laws. All of the AGs expressed a firm commitment to the responsibility
to defend and uphold their constitutions and laws. However, some said that they would
sometimes hire outside counsel to defend laws they did not feel they could personally
defend. Others said that it was part of the commitment to the office to defend everything
that comes before the office, regardless of personal opinion. While some explained that
they would defend anything that they did not find blatantly unconstitutional, others said it
was not within the scope of the AG to judge constitutionality. One AG explained that
decisions to defend, not defend, or appoint outside counsel on an issue will always lead
others (and even the AGs themselves) to question the decision and the motivations
behind it.
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Hypotheses

With evidence that the overall activity of attorneys general has increased, the
office’s ability to garner attention on a national scale, the potential for record building for
future campaigns, and the governors’ inability to exercise control over the AGs’ authority
to sue in the name of the public interest (Provost 2006), it is clear that the office of state
AG is a force to be reckoned with. Based on previous research and through insights
gained from interviews with attorneys general, it is clear that multistate litigation is
crucial part of the office. Furthermore, there are a number of factors that play into the
decisions to join multistate lawsuits, just as there are a number of factors leading to
campaigns for higher office, which may be perceived as a natural progression of the
office.
A clear example of the attorneys general’s influence is the 1998 Tobacco Master
Settlement Agreement. Greenblatt (2003) referenced this suit as states’ AGs refusing to
be “out-resourced” by big tobacco (again). The suit’s display of institutional power, in
addition to its success in winning hundreds of billions of dollars over time from tobacco
companies signals a greater awareness of the capabilities of the attorneys general.
Because of this widely acclaimed, nearly nation-wide success for the attorneys general,
the November 1998 MSA could be expected to mark a turning point in political ambition,
and forms the basis of my first hypothesis: H1: Attorneys general serving at the time of or
after the MSA are more likely to run for higher office than the AGs who served before the
MSA.
Research conducted by Sidorsky (2015) analyzes the tendency of women to be
politically ambitious in comparison to their male counterparts. She finds that, generally,
women exhibit less political ambition than men. Provost (2009) agrees that political
ambition is likely lower among female AGs versus their male colleagues. In addition to
existing literature, the significantly lower number of women than men serving as AG
historically across the country does not initially seem to provide contradictory evidence
to these theories, leading to my second hypothesis that H2: it could be reasonable to
assume female AGs would be less likely than male AGs to seek higher office.
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Provost (2003) makes claims about the policymaking role of active
“entrepreneurial” attorneys general, claiming that they have “tremendous influence” over
policy through litigation. He argues that AGs “see intense participation in multi-state
cases as a way to curry favor with voters (43).” Provost’s (2003) research also reflects
that AGs who are considered more aggressive in shaping policy express more progressive
ambition. This forms the basis of the third hypothesis: H3: The more active/litigious AGs
are the more likely they are to run for higher office.
Swinerton (1968) analyzes political ambition existing among state executives,
creating the classifications of “progressive,” “discrete,” and “latent” ambition. These
categories can be used to analyze attorneys general’s career and political ambition in their
decisions to leave office, seek an office of an equal or lesser status, or seek higher office.
“Appointing State Attorneys General: Evaluating the Unbundled State Executive” makes
the argument for the appointment of these officeholders as a means of reducing
politically motivated decisions and controlling for the current “problem” of AGs
exercising Swinerton’s (1968) progressive ambition by using the role to seek higher
office. Provost (2009) makes the claim that a person with political ambition would be
more attracted to holding an elected office initially. When interviewed, appointed AGs
also reaffirmed that states using appointment do not experience the same degree of
political ambition in AGs because these AGs are not primarily politicians and do not have
the experience of campaigning to be elected to this office, and I hypothesize as such: H4:
In states where the AG is popularly elected, AGs who were elected to office are more
likely to seek higher office than AGs who were appointed to fill a vacancy.
Historically, the offices of the AG, have been controlled by the Democratic Party.
After the foundation of RAGA in 1999, Republicans gained a larger share of the offices
across the country, increasing from 12 AGs to 20 by 2003. The 2014 midterm election
cycle was the first time in the nation’s history that Republican attorneys general held a
majority of seats. As AGs increasingly moved away from being an office controlled by
the majority-takes-all dynamic with the governor’s race, more focus was drawn to their
campaigns. One of the reasons that Republicans began campaigning for the office more
was that “the job came to be seen as a more important stepping stone to the governorship
than in the past, so Republicans became increasingly unwilling to concede this training
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post (Smith et a. 2005: 118).” Fifth, I hypothesize that: Republican AGs are more likely
to run for higher office than Democratic AGs (H5).
Many states did not institute term limits on AGs until the early 1990s. Currently,
only 17 of the 43 electing states impose these term limits.4 Because AGs tend to be aware
of their ability to campaign for a higher office and because timing is so influential in
deciding to seek a higher office, it seems reasonable to expect that attorneys general
serving under term limits seek higher office more frequently than AGs not serving under
term limits (H6).

4

Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota
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Data Source

To collect information on the attorneys general, I began with a knowledge base
obtained by working for the Republican Attorneys General Association. Through this
work, I learned much about the history of the office and the personal histories of the
officeholders. The extensive career and biographical data analyzed was initially obtained
through searches on sites such as Wikipedia. The information found on Wikipedia was
supplemented and confirmed by searches through AG websites, Secretaries of State
websites, local newspaper stories, obituaries, current employment profiles,
PoliticalGraveyard.com, OurCampaigns.com, and online resources through NAAG,
RAGA, DAGA, and the Council of State Governments. Case data used in analyzing
multistate litigation and amicus brief history was published by Paul Nolette.
Biographical data was collected on each AG to measure the independent variables
of the research. Information collected is listed in the following table: method of selection,
number of cases settled during the individual’s tenure, currently serving or formerly
served, time of service in relation to the MSA, number of months served, political party
affiliation (or switch) while in office, service under term limits, gender, work in the
public sector prior to service as AG, any level of elected or appointed public office prior
to service as AG, work in the AG’s office prior to service as AG, offices sought during or
after tenure as AG, and post-AG occupation.
Variable

Description

Measure

Method of selection

Whether elected only or

1=Elected

appointed to fill a vacancy

0=Appointed

Number of cases settled

Count of the cases settled

# of cases

during the individual AG’s

during tenure

tenure
Currently serving or

Is the AG currently serving

1=Current

formerly served

or has the AG left office?

0=Former
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Time of service in relation

If the AG served before,

1=Served during or after

to the MSA

after, or during the MSA

the MSA
0=Served prior to the MSA

Length of tenure

Count of number of

# of months

months in office
Political party affiliation

Republican or Democrat

1= Republican
0=Democrat

Service under term limits

Was the AG barred by

1=Term limited

term limits from seeking

0=No term limits

reelection
Gender

Male or female

1=Male
0=Female

Prior work in the public

Did the AG work in the

1=Prior public sector

sector

public sector before being

employment

elected or appointed

0=No prior public sector
employment

Prior elected or appointed

Did the AG hold a public

1=Prior office held

office

office before being elected

0=No prior office held

or appointed
Prior employment by the

Did the AG work in an

1=Prior employment in an

AG’s office

AG’s office before being

AG’s office

elected or appointed

0=No prior employment in
an AG’s office

Offices sought during or

Did the AG seek a higher

1=Sought higher office

after tenure as AG

office after being sworn in

0=Did not seek higher

as AG

office

Did the AG hold a higher

1=Elected to higher office

office after the completion

0=Not elected to higher

of their tenure

office

Post-AG occupation
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Due to the extensive opportunities available with the potential data in terms of the
timeline under which this research had to be completed, not all potential sources of
analysis could be included. Only states where the AG is elected rather than appointed are
analyzed. Currently serving attorneys general are not included in assessing political
ambition through running for higher office because the overwhelming majority of sitting
AGs have been elected since November 2014. Therefore, at the time of this project’s
completion, most of the AGs are less than halfway into serving their current terms,
meaning not all who will run can reasonably be expected to announce their intent at this
point. “Higher office” is defined as, on a state level, governor or state supreme court. On
a federal level, it is classified as US Senate, presidential appointments to federal
judgeships, and Cabinet positions. Finally, the case data from Nolette’s research, which
only includes the years of 1980-2013, was used. This time frame was not altered in order
to give both a historical perspective while capturing a relatively similar amount of time
both before and after the MSA.
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Data Analysis

There was a wide array of interesting data to be collected on the attorneys general.
The following graphs illustrate some of the most basic research findings: the number of
multistate cases completed in the studied time frame, the number of AGs who seek higher
office versus the number of AGs who are elected to higher office, the number of male
AGs versus the number of female AGs, and the number of AGs who worked in the public
sector, held an elected or appointed office, or worked in the AG’s office prior to their
own tenure as AG.

Multistate Cases per Year
Number of Multistate Cases

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1980

1983

1986

1989

1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

2007

2010

2013

Year Settled
All Cases

MSA

Figure 1
Over the time period studied, the number of overall multistate cases did increase
(Figure 1). This reflects a growing scope of the AG’s office as states become increasingly
involved in litigating the interests of the public. However, the Tobacco MSA does not
appear to reflect a turning point in this trend. While the number of cases does, for the
most part, continue in an overall upward trend, the MSA does not provide evidence of
creating a sharp increase in these cases.
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Percentage of attorneys general
seeking and elected to higher office
100
80
60
40
20
0
Seek higher office

Elected to higher office

Figure 2
Of the attorneys general whose period of service occurred at any point during
1980 through the 2015 election cycle, only 20.38% of all AGs were successful in winning
election to a higher office (Figure 2). This reflects that, if the office is used as a political
stepping stone, it is not a very successful one. During this same time period, 60.19% of
AGs made an attempt to run for a higher office. 33.85% of those who declared intent to
run for a higher office ended up being elected. Thus, a majority of AGs do express
political ambition by running for a higher office, but less than half of those running will
be elected and less than a quarter of all AGs from 1980-2015 have gone on to serve in a
higher office since leaving the AG’s office. While the office certainly seems to have
potential to be a political stepping stone and claims of record building through litigation
and policy influence are reasonable, attorneys general as a group seem to be ultimately
unsuccessful in winning races for higher political office.
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Gender
34

226

Male

Female

Figure 3
While later analysis will reflect that gender is not a statistically significant
indicator of the likelihood to run for higher office, it is important to mention the gender
distribution of officeholders over time (Figure 3). 13.08% of the attorneys general
included in the dataset were women (34), while 86.92% were men (226).

Prior Experience in the Public Sector

Prior Experience

No Experience

Figure 4
During interviews with a number of attorneys general, the notion of public service
was a consistent factor in the decision to run for or accept appointment as AG (Figure 4).
The graph above shows the number of attorneys general, including sitting AGs, who
worked in the public sector in some capacity before their tenure as AG. 96.14% of
attorneys general had experience working in the public sector. While public service may
not be an explicit motivation for all or even for a majority of attorneys general, such a
high volume of AGs beginning their careers with work in some field of public service
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leads to the understanding that prior public service is a necessary experience for
successful attainment of the AG office.

Prior Elected or Appointed Office

held office

didn't hold office

Figure 5
A number of attorneys general held some form of an appointed or elected office
before their time as AG (Figure 5). 72.37% had been elected or appointed to some type of
public office before becoming AG. Although the number is not as high as those who
worked in the public sector, this percentage reflects that this office is not an entry level
public leadership position for nearly three quarters of the officeholders. This also alludes
to political ambition, as many AGs have a public record to campaign on to successfully
reach this office.

Prior service in the AG office

prior service

no prior service

Figure 6
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A potential method of recruiting future attorneys general to the office is beginning
as staff attorneys in the offices they seek to hold (Figure 6). Theoretically, working as
one of the vast number of attorneys employed by AG offices across the nation, the
exposure to the office and the relevant experience could lead to a large portion of AGs
beginning their career in this office. However, only 22.57% of attorneys general from
1980 through present day worked in an AG’s office before holding the position
themselves. Although many did not begin their career this way, due to the high volume of
AGs who had previously been elected or worked in the public sector, there may be a high
probability that they worked with or in close proximity to an AG.
Statistical analysis software (STATA) was used to assess the first claim that AGs
would be more likely to run for office if they served during or after the tobacco
settlement (with the exception of currently serving AGs). The likelihood of an AG to run
for higher office was analyzed based on whether or not the AG was in office at the time
of the MSA (Table 1), took office after the settlement (Table 2), or had completed their
service before the settlement (Table 3).5 This analysis revealed that the likelihood of AGs
to seek higher office was only statistically significant for AGs completing their tenure
prior to the MSA. Thus, the hypothesis was incorrect in the claim that the MSA was a
definitive turning point for increased political ambition.
The data collected on the AGs contained far fewer instances of women holding
the office of AG, although the number of female AGs has increased since 1980. In
analyzing the likelihood of women to run for a higher office after holding the position of
AG, the data reflected a statistical insignificance. Thus, gender is not a reliable predictor
of an AG’s likelihood for seek a higher office, meaning that the second hypothesis was
incorrect.

5

Tables are at the end of the section.
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Probability of Seeking Higher Office

Political Ambition Based on Litigiouness in Office
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Figure 7
The likelihood of AGs to run for a higher office was calculated for different time
periods (serving before the MSA, serving at the time of the MSA, and serving after the
MSA) based on the number of cases completed during their service increased from 0 to
275 (from the lowest number of cases to approximately the highest number of cases
attributed to a single AG’s tenure within the dataset). The findings reinforced the
negation of the first hypothesis—the probability of running for higher office for AGs
serving at or after the MSA was lower than the probability of AGs completing their
service prior to the settlement. However, all three reflected the same trend that confirms
the third hypothesis. For attorneys general serving in each time frame, the probability of
seeking higher office rose as the number of cases attributed to that AG rose (Figure 7).
Although the data analyzed only included states in which the AG is traditionally elected,
there is still the possibility for alternate selection methods to be utilized in these states. In
addition to being elected, AGs can be appointed to fill a vacancy, or they can be
appointed to fill a vacancy and then be re-elected to the office as an incumbent.6
Confirming the claim made by the appointed AGs in interviews, appointed AGs even in
electing states may also demonstrate less political ambition, thus leading to the potential
claim that elected AGs in electing states have the highest chance of running for higher
6

Georgia did not have an AG race without an incumbent since the 1960s for this reason.

300
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office. The analyses of all three time frames proved the statistical significance of elected
AGs being more likely to seek higher office, thus validating the fourth hypothesis.
Although the majority of AG offices were occupied by Democrats for the
majority of the nation’s history, Republicans began controlling more of these seats
following the establishment of RAGA and the increased perception of the office as a
“training post” for the governorship that the party was “increasingly unwilling to concede
(Smith et al. 2005: 118).” For this reason, it would be reasonable to infer that Republican
attorneys general possess more progressive political ambition, making members of the
GOP more likely to seek higher office than their Democratic counterparts. While it is
interesting to learn about the historical partisan control of the office, analysis proved that,
regardless of time served in relation to the MSA, political party was not a statistically
significant factor in predicting campaigns for higher office. Thus, the fifth hypothesis was
rejected.
Finally, the sixth hypothesis makes the claim that attorneys general serving under
the constraint of term limits would be more likely to run than AGs serving in states that
do not impose limits. It seems logical that both exposure to the potential to run for higher
office and the awareness of an inevitable departure from the AG role would make a
person more likely to seek a higher office. However, the data rejected the sixth
hypothesis by reflecting the statistical insignificance of term limits on an AG’s likelihood
of running for higher office.
Ultimately, fewer factors were found to be significant indicators of ambition than
were initially expected. Gender, political party, term limits, and service at the time of or
following the Tobacco MSA were not statistically significant in predicting progressive
ambition. The number of cases settled during an AG’s tenure and being only elected (in
electing states) to the office were strong indicators that AG would seek higher office.
Furthermore, completion of tenure prior to the MSA was significant in predicting the
probability of an AG to run for a higher office. The number of AGs beginning their
careers in the public sector and the large majority holding some type of public office
prior to election reflect a degree of experience that may be initially required in order for
an individual to become AG.
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Data for AGs serving at the time of the Tobacco MSA
Robust
Seek Higher

Odds

Standard

Office

Ratio

Error

z

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

Gender (Male)

1.34248

0.669488

0.59

0.555

0.505147

3.567779

1.010701

0.004148

2.59

0.009

1.002604

1.018864

10.3303

4.45

0.000

4.785959

56.34783

0.724735

0.23431

-1

0.319

0.384576

1.365765

0.876527

0.31156

-0.37

0.711

0.436724

1.759233

(Nov. 1998)

0.810314

0.355803

-0.48

0.632

0.342686

1.916064

_cons

0.081834

0.056522

-3.62

0.000

0.021136

0.316846

Number of
Cases Settled
During Tenure

Elected to Office 16.42189
Political Party
(Republican)
Served Under
Term Limits
Served at the
Time of the
Tobacco Master
Settlement
Agreement

Table 1
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Data for AGs serving after the Tobacco MSA (Jan. 1999+)
Robust
Seek Higher

Odds

Standard

Office

Ratio

Error

z

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

Gender (Male)

1.435077

0.680084

0.76

0.446

0.566879

3.632957

Tenure

1.01353

0.006038

2.26

0.024

1.001765

1.025434

Elected to Office

14.99416

9.117949

4.45

0.000

4.553093

49.37849

0.733006

0.235131

-0.97

0.333

0.390897

1.374524

1.007856

0.377818

0.02

0.983

0.483399

2.101315

1999 and on)

0.521533

0.260602

-1.3

0.193

0.195862

1.388718

_cons

0.083956

0.057933

-3.59

0.000

0.021711

0.324651

Number of Cases
Settled During

Political Party
(Republican)
Served Under
Term Limits
Served after the
tobacco Master
Settlement
Agreement (Jan.

Table 2
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Data for AGs completing serving before the Tobacco MSA
Robust
Seek Higher

Standard

Office

Odds Ratio

Error

z

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

Gender (Male)

1.117344

0.5694425

0.22

0.828

0.411511

3.03384

Number of

1.019947

0.0069099

2.92

0.004

1.006493

1.03358

16.05948

9.798449

4.55

0.000

4.857174

53.09813

0.7819876

0.2557844

-0.75

0.452

0.411885

1.484649

1.214931

0.4816884

0.49

0.623

0.5585635

2.642596

3.381222

1.749264

2.35

0.019

1.226613

9.320515

0.0319332

0.0245348

-4.48

0.000

0.0070835

0.143958

Cases Settled
During Tenure
Elected to
Office
Political Party
(Republican)
Served Under
Term Limits
Completed
Service Prior to
MSA
_cons
Table 3
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Conclusion

The state AG’s office is one that plays a key role both in state and federal policy.
Often times, the officials holding the office go on to campaign for higher office, although
they are not always successful. Overall, this research was effective in determining factors
that both are and are not relevant to the evolution of the office of state AG and the
political ambition of the officeholders. It allows readers to understand the potential held
within the office of the attorneys general, both in policy and politics.
This research presents many findings that have been relatively understudied in
political science literature, but there are many more aspects of the offices that should be
given further consideration in future research. States that appoint the AG should be
included in the data set to form a more complete understanding of all of the attorneys
general rather than only those in states that elect AGs. Case data should also undergo a
deeper analysis, possibly giving special attention to legal action involving the federal
government where the states are acting under the auspices of the 10th Amendment.
Campaign finance data could provide a better idea of the growing political value of the
office. State and office budget and size could be interesting in analyzing the relationship
and/or correlation, if any exists, between the sizes of budgets, staff, and population and
the frequency of an AG to be party to multistate litigation.
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Appendix I-Interview Questions



Can you describe the career path that led you to become an attorney general?



What motivated you to run for attorney general? Did you know prior to running
for AG that this was a terminal office for you, or did you intend to eventually seek
higher office?



Did you ever or have you ever considered running for a higher office? Why?



It has been commented that “AG” is often times short for aspiring governor as
opposed to attorney general. What are your thoughts on this? Do you think it has
positive or negative connotations?



In recent years, there has been an expansion in multi-state litigation, whether it be
against a corporation, the federal government, or another state. How do you/did
you see this influencing the work you do/did as attorney general?



What are/were your relationships with other state attorneys general like? Did your
relationships with them ever impact the work you did in your own state?



Do you believe that RAGA/DAGA has been beneficial to the work of the AGs?
Not necessarily to the financial aspect of campaigning, but the substantive work
the AGs do?



How did your interactions with NAAG or the other AGs involved in NAAG
impact your own work as AG?



In many states the governor and attorney general are of the same party, but in
other states they are of different parties. Do you see this as influential in any way?
How important is it to have a good relationship with the governor, personally
and/or professionally?



In your opinion, is this an office that should be elected? Why?



As an AG, can/did you introduce a legislative packet or work with the legislature
in drafting policy? If so, how did you determine what policies to prioritize?



Have you ever defended or refused to defend a law that you did not personally
agree with? Why?
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Appendix II-Interviewee Data



14 Total Interviews



Current vs. Former
o Current: 5
o Former: 9



Elected vs. Appointed
o Elected: 10
o Appointed: 4



Male vs. Female
o Male: 11
o Female: 3



Republican vs. Democrat
o Republican: 9
o Democrat: 5

Attorneys general were chosen for interviews based first on personal
accessibility/convenience. The list expanded at the recommendation and referral of the
AGs to their colleagues. Ultimately, the most influential factor in who I spoke to was
who responded to my emails.

